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Abstract- CAPTCHAs or reverse Turing tests are real-time 
assessments used by programs (or computers) to tell humans 
and machines apart. This is achieved by assigning and assessing 
hard AI problems that could only be solved easily by human but 
not by machines. Applications of such assessments range from 
stopping spammers from automatically filling online forms to 
preventing hackers from performing dictionary attack. Today, 
the race between makers and breakers of CAPTCHAs is at a 
juncture, where the CAPTCHAs proposed are not even 
answerable by humans. We consider such CAPTCHAs as non 
user friendly. In this paper, we propose a novel technique for 
reverse Turing test - we call it the Line CAPTCHAs - that mainly 
focuses on user friendliness while not compromising the security 
aspect that is expected to be provided by such a system. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
CAPTCHA is a challenge-response test used by computer 
programs to guarantee that the response is not generated by 
another computer (or program) [1]. The word CAPTCHA 
stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to 
tell Computers and Humans Apart. CAPTCHAs are also 
known as reverse Turing test where a computer is the judge1 
or Human Interactive Proofs (HIP). CAPTCHAs are used to 
protect many types of websites, including free email 
providers, online ticket sellers, social networks, and blogs. 
For example, CAPTCHAs prevent ticket scalpers from using 
computer programs to buy large numbers of concert tickets, 
only to resell them at an inflated price. The main problem 
with almost all modern CAPTCHA methods is their user 
friendliness. Most of the unbroken CAPTCHA methods of 
today are difficult to understand and respond even by 
humans. Figure 1 depicts such a CAPTCHA method used by 
Yahoo! (http://www.yahoo.com) to prevent spammers filling 
their online forms. 
 
 
Fig. 1. An unbroken CAPTCHA used by Yahoo! (http://www.yahoo.com) to 
stop spammers filling their online forms. Human users are expected to read 
the distorted characters and fill them in a textbox correctly. This example 
depicts the difficulty of responding to such a CAPTCHA even by human. 
                                                           
1 As opposed to the human judge in the Turing test 
II. APPLICATIONS OF CAPTCHAS 
CAPTCHAs are becoming an important component of web 
security. Nowadays CAPTCHAs have a wide variety of 
applications on the web and we are discussing a number of 
them here.  
 A. Online Polls 
In November 1999, slashdot.com released an online poll 
asking, which was the best graduate school in computer 
science [2]. As is the case with most online polls, IP 
addresses of voters were recorded in order to prevent single 
users from voting more than once. However, students at 
Carnegie Mellon found a way to mark your ballot by using 
programs that voted for CMU thousands of times from 
computers around the world. CMU's score started growing 
rapidly. The following day, students at MIT wrote their own 
voting program and the poll became a contest between voting 
bots (programs). MIT finished with 21,156 votes, Carnegie 
Mellon with 21,032 and every other school (who didn’t use 
computer programs to vote) with less than 1,000 votes. This 
incident brought the question of whether the result of any 
online poll can be trusted. The answer is no, unless the poll 
will guarantee that only humans can vote. A CAPTCHA can 
be used to make this guarantee. 
B.  Free Email Services  
Several companies (such as Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft) 
offer free email services, most of which suffer from a specific 
type of attack: bots that sign up for thousands of email 
accounts every minute [3]. This situation can be avoided or 
improved by requiring users to prove that they are human 
before they can get a free email account. Yahoo!, for 
instance, uses a CAPTCHA to prevent bots from registering 
for email accounts. Their CAPTCHA asks it user to read one 
or more distorted words such as the one shown in Figure 1 to 
guarantee that they are serving a human and not a computer 
bot. This particular challenge is a CAPTCHA because current 
computer programs are not as good as humans at reading 
distorted text. Therefore a computer bot will not be able to 
respond correctly to such a challenge – this type of a problem 
is also known as a hard AI (Artificial Intelligence) problem.  
 
C. Search Engine Bots 
Owners of some websites do not want their sites to be 
indexed by search engines. There is an HTML tag to prevent 
search engine bots from reading web pages. However, the tag 
does not guarantee that the bots will not read the pages; it 
only serves as to say no to bots used for indexing the web. 
Search engine bots, given that they usually belong to large 
esteemed companies, respect web pages that do not want to 
allow them in. However, these tags will not stop bots from 
indexing those web pages. In order to truly guarantee that 
bots will not enter a web site, CAPTCHAs are needed. 
D. Worms and Spam  
CAPTCHAs also offer a plausible solution against email 
worms and spam: email clients can adapt to a policy such as it 
only accepts an email if it knows there is a human behind the 
other computer from where that particular email is sent. A 
few companies, such as http://www.spamarrest.com are 
already marketing this idea. 
E. Preventing Dictionary Attacks.  
Pinkas and Sander [4] have suggested using CAPTCHAs to 
prevent dictionary attacks in password based systems. The 
idea is simple: prevent a computer from being able to iterate 
through the entire space of passwords by requiring a human 
to type the passwords. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF CAPTCHAS 
There are several types of CAPTCHAs used in the recent 
past. People have used text images and sound CAPTCHAs. 
People can use any type of CAPTCHA method in their 
applications as long as the methods have the following 
characteristics [3]: 
1. Automation and grade-ability: The test should be   
automatically generated and graded by a machine. This is 
the main requirement of a CAPTCHA. It is interesting to 
note that, although the test is both generated and graded 
by a machine, the machine will not be able to solve (or 
respond to) the test. 
 
2. Easy for human: The test should be quickly and easily 
taken by a human user (the response time is typically 
within 30 seconds).  
 
3. Challenging and hard for machine: The test should be 
based on a well-known hard AI problem and the best 
existing techniques should be far from solving the 
problem.  
An example problem that satisfies this requirement is 
“automatic image understanding” which is well known 
and has been investigated for more than three decades 
but is still without success. On the other hand, printed 
clean text OCR (Optical Character Recognition) is not a 
hard AI problem, as it can be solved with existing 
techniques. 
 
4. Universality: The test should be independent of user’s 
language, physical location, and education background. 
This guideline is motivated by practical considerations, 
and is especially important for companies with 
international customers such as Google, Yahoo! and 
Microsoft. It would be a difficult for Google if they had 
to localize a CAPTCHA test to 50 different languages. 
As an example, any digits-based audio CAPTCHA tests 
are not universal because there is no universal language 
on digits (even though visually they are the same). A 
different CAPTCHA test would have to be implemented 
for each different language, thus not cost effective. 
Strictly speaking, no CAPTCHA test can be absolutely 
universal, as there are no two humans who are the same 
in this world. However, we can make reasonable 
assumptions. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that 
a human who is using a computer knows the 10 digits 
and the 26 English alphabets.  
 
5. Resistance to no-effort attacks: The test should survive 
no-effort attacks. No-effort attacks are the ones that can 
solve a CAPTCHA test without solving the hard AI 
problem.  
 
6. Robustness when database publicized: The test should be 
difficult to attack even if the database, from which the 
test is generated, is publicized.  
 
It is worth to note that these characteristics are a summary of 
what is presented in [3]. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
Even though CAPTCHA is a very new area of research, it 
has already attracted researchers from AI, cryptography, 
signal processing, and computer vision. The first idea related 
to CAPTCHA (although it was not named CAPTCHA) was 
written by Naor who wrote a note on this in 1996 [5]. The 
first working system was developed in 1997 by researchers at 
Alta Vista [6]. The goal of this system was to prevent 
automated programs from adding URLs to the search engine 
to disturb its search results. The specific technique they used 
was based on distorted characters, and it worked well in 
defeating regular optical character recognition (OCR) 
systems. 
   The term "CAPTCHA" was originally introduced in 2000 
by Luis von Ahn, Manuel Blum, Nicholas J. Hopper (all of 
CMU), and John Langford (then of IBM) [7, 10]. The CMU 
team is one of the mostly active research team in CAPTCHA 
research from that point onwards. They have developed a 
number of concrete CAPTCHA systems [8] such as Gimpy, 
Bongo [9], Pix, AnimalPix and reCAPTCHA [11]. 
 In the mean time, researchers at PARC and UC Berkeley 
have come up with a number of CAPTCHA techniques [12-
14]. In their systems, they mainly explored the gap between 
human and programs in terms of reading poorly printed texts. 
In one of their systems, Pessimal Print [13], they reported 
close to zero recognition rates from three existing OCR 
systems: Expervision, FineReader and IRIS Reader. In 
another system, BaffleText [14], Chew and Baird further used 
non-English words to defend dictionary attacks. 
In year 2000, Xu, Lipton and Ess, researchers at Georgia 
Tech have proposed a system to patch the security holes in E-
commerce applications [15]. Another system proposed in [3] 
used distorted human faces to make CAPTCHAs. 
Apart from the visual CAPTCHAs, there exist a number of 
audio CAPTCHAs. The general idea is to add noise and 
reverberation to clean speech such that existing speech 
recognizers can no longer recognize it. Eco [8], Byan [16] and 
the one presented in [18] are such systems.  
The CAPTCHAs discussed up to now are all explicit 
CAPTCHAs. They are introduced as an additional exercise 
during browsing to prove that you are human. In 2005, Baird 
and Bentley proposed implicit CAPTCHAs [17]. An example 
from their list of such CAPTCHAs is an unconscious 
CAPTCHA in the form of a link on the text “MORE 
PHOTOS," rendered as an image. Such link text can be 
rendered deliberately to be difficult for machine readers, to 
form one in a series of effective implicit CAPTCHAs. Even 
though implicit CAPTCHAs eliminate the need for additional 
tasks to be performed by the users of explicit CAPTCHAs, 
they burden the website designers to come up with innovative 
CAPTCHAs to be embedded in their websites. 
We realize that the race between CAPTCHA designers and 
breakers is a real one and the readers could refer to the 
following papers on the topic of breaking (and broken) 
CAPTCHAs: [19-23].  
It is obvious that most of the CAPTCHAs with characters, 
images and audio are being broken. To improve the security, 
the developers increase the complexity of the system (by 
adapting to a harder AI problem) such as the character 
sequence presented in Figure 1. To solve such complex 
CAPTCHAs, sometimes even humans have to input values 
multiple times. Therefore, it is a big issue when considering 
the user friendliness of such CAPTCHAs. In addition we 
failed to find CAPTCHA methods which use lines and mouse 
movements for human interactive proofs. We consider mouse 
movements to be easily performed by human and therefore 
propose Line CAPTCHA, where lines and mouse movements 
are used to tell computer and human apart. 
 
V. LINE CAPTCHAS 
A. Overview 
The CAPTCHA technique that we have proposed and 
implemented, Line CAPTCHA, basically gives users an image 
which has a distorted/broken line or a set of random lines. 
Then the user is expected to just drag the mouse along (while 
pressing the left button) the line continuously. When the user 
releases the left mouse button, the system performs the 
verification (also known as grading). At this moment we are 
proposing two Line CAPTCHAs (see Figure 2): (1) the user is 
expected to identify and draw on top of a line in a blurred 
image with a rich colourful background and (2) the user is 
expected to identify and draw on top a randomly segmented 
line (a continuous line that is segmented) again with a rich 
colourful background of line segments.  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Sample images of Line CAPTCHA. The one on the left is a blurred 
line on a colourful background and the one on the right is a randomly 
(pseudo random) segmented line. 
In the first Line CAPTCHA, the assumption is the 
following: even though it is possible for a computer to 
identify and break such a CAPTCHA, the time taken to 
perform a line detection of a blurred line in an image with so 
many blurred other images is high such that an attack is not 
worth performing. However, this assumption could be 
challenged and therefore the validity of this Line CAPTCHA. 
However, the second Line CAPTCHA we have proposed has 
no such limitations. In the second Line CAPTCHA, we have a 
segmented line and a number of other line segments which 
are not part of any lines. Although, it is easy for a human to 
identify such a segmented line (see Figure 6), it is not the 
case for a computer. For a computer, there are many line 
segments and testing whether all these line segments will 
form a segmented line is tedious. This is the assumption made 
regarding the second Line CAPTCHA and the argument 
behind its validity as a CAPTCHA.  
As mentioned earlier, one of the main objectives (if not 
"the" objective) of Line CAPTCHA is its user friendliness. A 
user who is expected to use a Line CAPTCHA will not even 
have to take his hand off the mouse. Just by using a "mouse 
drag" it is possible to respond to this CAPTCHA test. 
Random tests performed with users who have no familiarity 
with Line CAPTCHAs have shown more than 80% success 
rate in their first attempts. We will discuss the 
implementation steps of our Line CAPTCHAs in the 
following sub-section. 
 
B. Implementation 
Implementation of Line CAPTCHA is simple. The steps we 
followed in our implementation are described here. The 
implementation has two major phases and they are: (1) 
random image generation and (2) verification (or grading) of 
the user inputs. For the image generation, we followed three 
basic steps and they are: (1) background generation, (2) line 
generation and (3) distraction. 
1. Background Generation 
First the background of the image is generated. Random 
shapes with random colours are drawn in the background of 
the image as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The first step in image generation. Background of the image is 
generated with random shapes and colours. An image library of the 
implementation language is used for this purpose. 
2. Line Generation 
The second step is to draw the line on top of the 
background image. There could be several ways to draw 
lines. Line can be drawn using random coordinates or using 
mathematical equations. In our implementation, cubic curves 
were used to draw the line with necessary random points. 
These points are stored in the memory to perform the grading 
in the next phase of the CAPTCHA.  
 
Fig. 4: The second step in image generation. The Line is drawn on the 
background. 
3. Distraction 
We call the next part of the image generation phase as the 
distraction phase. It should be noted that the image should not 
be distorted too much as the main goal of Line CAPTCHA is 
to increase the user friendliness. Too much of distraction will 
make it difficult for human. However, the drawn line should 
not be detected by a program as a single continuous line. As 
mentioned earlier in the overview, we propose two techniques 
first of which could be challenged. The two methods are 
blurring (as shown by an example in Figure 5) and line 
segmenting (as shown by an example in Figure 6). 
The second phase of the implementation should be capable 
of grading human answers and verifying them (as correct or 
incorrect). This is achieved by storing the points used for 
drawing the original line in part two of phase one and then 
checking these points against the points generated by the 
mouse drag in this phase.  
Line CAPTCHAs could be considered user-friendly than 
the existing CAPTCHA methods. In addition they could be 
used with any languages and therefore this technique is 
universal. However, this kind of CAPTCHAs cannot be used 
by visually impaired people. Broken line recognition (the 
second Line CAPTCHA proposed) is much harder to a 
computer program since the line is drawn randomly so it is 
difficult to use specific masks for recognition. 
 
 
Fig. 5. The first type of Line CAPTCHA proposed. A blurred image with a 
blurred line in it. The user is expected to drag on top of the line. 
 
 
Fig. 6. The second type of Line CAPTCHA proposed. An image with a 
broken line (its done via line segmenting) and a large number of other 
objects, potential to be similar to the segments of the broken line. 
The line segmenting technique could be subjected to colour 
separation attack - where an attacker separate pixels with 
different colours and then try to identify lines. To overcome 
this, we propose lines with multiple colour segments. A line 
with multiple colour segments could be used to overcome 
colour separation attack. 
 
C. More Line CAPTCHAs 
There could be more types of Line CAPTCHAs suggested 
and implemented with similar characteristics and user inputs. 
One such method is to use multiple lines with different 
colours and asking the user to select and draw on top a line 
with a particular colour as shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
Fig. 7. An example for a different Line CAPTCHA.  An image with multiple 
lines of different colours. The user could be asked to drag on top of a 
particular coloured line. 
The validity of this Line CAPTCHA is in question for the 
same reason as the first CAPTCHA we proposed earlier.  If a 
program can identify a line, then it can draw on top of a line 
randomly with a certain probability of success. In a secure 
CAPTCHA, the success rate for random inputs is considered 
to be less than 0.2%. So to get that rate there should be 500 
lines in the image which is not practical. However, the reason 
for proposing this Line CAPTCHA is as follows: this Line 
CAPTCHA cannot be considered vulnerable for random input 
attack, since the computer has to first identify the lines before 
performing a random attack and this identification is going to 
consume significantly large time.  
This Line CAPTCHA can be further enhanced for security 
by displaying the colour of the line to be drawn by using 
something like a reCAPTCHA [11]. reCAPTCHA, as shown 
in Figure 8, is a distorted text based CAPTCHA method that 
is considered unbreakable.  
 
 Fig. 8: A sample reCAPTCHA from http://recaptcha.net. It can be integrated 
with colour line based Line CAPTCHA for added security. 
We consider reCAPTCHAs as non-user friendly, when it 
comes to reading and retyping every word (which is unknown 
to the users) tested. However, we believe that the user will be 
able to identify words for colours easily in reCAPTCHA (as 
the users are at an advantage of even predicting the word, 
since they expect a colour). Therefore this setup could still be 
considered user friendly and will have the added security.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
CAPTCHAs or reverse Turing tests are used by programs 
(or machines) to differentiate humans and machines apart. 
The race between makers and breakers of CAPTCHAs is at a 
juncture where the CAPTCHAs proposed today are not 
answerable even by humans due to their complexity and non 
user friendliness. We consider CAPTCHAs that are 
unanswerable by human as non-user friendly. In this paper, 
we have proposed a novel CAPTCHA technique, known as 
Line CAPTCHAs which are distorted lines on non-plain 
background and are solved by mouse drags. Line CAPTCHAs 
mainly focus on user friendliness while not compromising the 
security that such systems are expected to provide. 
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